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Two studies examined whether volitional resources can shield implicit
self-evaluation against the autonomy-undermining influence of external de-
mands. Volitional resources were operationalized as individual differences in
action orientation (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). Implicit self-evaluation was as-
sessed via an adaptation of the affective priming task (Fazio, 2001). In Study 1,
a threatening visualization led participants with low action orientation (or
“state-oriented” individuals) to display less autonomous implicit self-evalua-
tions compared to participants with high action orientation. In Study 2, perfor-
mance-contingent rewards led action-oriented participants to display more
autonomous implicit self-evaluations than state-oriented participants. These
findings were specific to the autonomy motive. Volitional shielding plays an
important role in self-defense processes.
Whether they like it or not, people are continually exposed to the norms
and expectations of their environment. These external demands exert a
pervasive influence on people’s actions, by providing guidelines for ap-
propriate behavior (Asch, 1956; Kuhl & Kazén, 1994; Shah, Kruglanski,
& Friedman, 2003). Furthermore, external demands shape and define
people’s conceptions of themselves, by acting as standards against
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which the self’s qualities can be assessed (Higgins, 1987). As long as ex-
ternal demands are compatible with people’s needs and talents, people
will experience little difficulties in meeting these demands. However,
sometimes the weight of external demands becomes too heavy. When
this occurs, people become undermined in their personal autonomy and
easily lose sight of their intrinsic psychological needs (Deci & Ryan,
2000; Kasser & Sheldon, in press; Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & Cook, 2004).
Consequently, people’s ability to deal with external demands is vital to
the maintenance of long-term well-being.
Because social life is often highly demanding, it seems plausible that
people have developed some efficient ways of shielding the self against
the psychological burdens of external demands. Without such shielding
mechanisms, people might become excessively vulnerable to external in-
fluence and “choke” even under minimal amounts of pressure
(Baumeister, 1984). Accordingly, shielding the self against external de-
mands represents an important aspect of people’s capacity for volitional
action control (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). In line with this reasoning, the pres-
ent research argues that volitional mechanisms may allow individuals to
shield themselves against the autonomy-undermining influence of exter-
nal demands. As a consequence, individuals who are highly adept at voli-
tional action control may maintain an autonomous self even under highly
demanding circumstances. Conversely, individuals who display voli-
tional deficits may be lacking in similar shielding skills, so that their self’s
autonomy may become more easily undermined by external demands.
In the following paragraphs, I will review the existing literature on the
relation between autonomy and external demands. Next, I discuss how
the concept of volitional shielding may resolve some of the apparent
contradictions in this literature. Finally, I present two experiments that
tested the present analysis in the domain of implicit self-evaluation.
THE WEIGHT OF EXTERNAL DEMANDS
One of the most influential scientific approaches to human autonomy is
self-determination theory (SDT; Deci Ryan, 2000). SDT defines auton-
omy as the set of processes that regulate the person’s actions and experi-
ences in accordance with self-endorsed values, needs, and intentions.
Accordingly, SDT has argued that a highly demanding environment is
generally detrimental to autonomous functioning. In support of SDT, re-
search has shown that various kinds of external demands, such as ex-
trinsic rewards, surveillance, or deadlines, serve to undermine intrinsic
motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000). External demands have also been
shown to undermine other indicators of autonomous functioning, such
as creativity (Amabile, 1979) and complex problem solving (McGraw &
McCullers, 1979).
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The idea that external demands tend to undermine autonomous func-
tioning has gained widespread acceptance (e.g., Geen, 1995;
Heckhausen, 1991; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Goldenberg, 2003). Nev-
ertheless, recent work has challenged the traditional understanding of
the relationship between external demands and autonomous function-
ing. Based on a meta-analytic review of the literature, Eisenberger and
Cameron (1996) argued that the undermining effects of extrinsic re-
wards on intrinsic motivation and creativity are largely a myth (though
see Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999, for a meta-analysis that reached the
opposite conclusion). In addition, Eisenberger and associates have
found that extrinsic rewards can increase intrinsic motivation and cre-
ativity (see Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001, for a review). It thus seems
questionable whether external demands are invariably detrimental to
autonomous functioning.
Based on the aforementioned findings, some authors have suggested
that the autonomy motive can be fully explained in terms of operant con-
ditioning principles (Carton, 1996; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). How-
ever, simple conditioning processes cannot account for the robust
evidence that external demands can and frequently do undermine au-
tonomous functioning (Amabile, 1979; Deci & Ryan, 2000). A more via-
ble approach, then, might be to consider whether the autonomy motive
operates in a more complex manner than has been previously assumed.
Conceivably, there exist some hidden moderating variables that deter-
mine how the autonomy motive is affected by demanding circum-
stances. In the following section, I will argue that volitional shielding is
one important moderator of the effects of external demands on
autonomous functioning.
VOLITIONAL SHIELDING
The notion of volitional shielding builds upon Personality Systems In-
teractions (PSI) theory, a general framework that seeks to explain human
action control and personality functioning (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, in
press). PSI theory agrees with the self-determination perspective that ex-
ternal demands can undermine autonomous functioning. However, PSI
theory goes on to argue that this undermining effect may not be alto-
gether unavoidable. According to PSI theory, people may draw on voli-
tional shielding to counter-regulate the autonomy-undermining
influence of external demands. Provided that a people’s shielding skills
are sufficiently strong, autonomy might be maintained or even en-
hanced under highly demanding circumstances. Thus, the auton-
omy-undermining effects of external demands may materialize only
when the person does not possess adequate volitional resources to
shield the self against external demands.
102 KOOLE
According to PSI theory, individuals who are adept at volitional ac-
tion control, or “action-oriented” individuals, are likely to possess espe-
cially powerful volitional shielding skills. The functional basis of action
orientation is provided by extension memory, a central executive system
that supports an intelligent, high-inferential form of intuition (Baumann
& Kuhl, 2002), and is characterized by the activation of extended net-
works of implicit self-representations (Koole & Kuhl, 2003). The work-
ings of extension memory are largely implicit, because the system is
mediated by parallel-distributed processing mechanisms that can han-
dle vast amounts of information at speeds that greatly exceed the capac-
ity of the conscious mind (J. L. McClelland et al., 1995; Read, Vanman, &
Miller, 1997). At the same time, extension memory is a volitional system,
because it is supported by central (i.e., prefrontal) processing networks
in the brain that regulate behavior in a top-down manner.
According to PSI theory, action-oriented individuals have learned to
activate extension memory when they are confronted with demanding
circumstances. This is often an effective strategy, because extension
memory can defuse self-threatening information quickly (due to exten-
sion memory’s powerful parallel-processing mechanisms) and durably
(because threatening information is integrated rather than suppressed
by extension memory). By contrast, individuals who regularly display
volitional deficits—or “state-oriented” individuals—are inclined to de-
activate extension memory when they encounter obstacles to autono-
mous self-regulation. Although state-oriented individuals may access
extension memory under supportive conditions, they typically lose ac-
cess to the system under more demanding conditions. State-oriented
individuals are thus characterized by relatively weak volitional
shielding skills.
To date, more than thirty published studies have supported the va-
lidity of the action orientation construct (for reviews, see Diefendorff,
Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). Among other
things, research has established that task performance of action-ori-
ented individuals is hardly affected by a range of autonomy-under-
mining influences, such as repeated failure, monotony, and
performance pressure (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). By contrast, the same
conditions induce marked performance impairments among state-ori-
ented individuals. In addition, autonomy threats lead state-oriented
individuals to experience uncontrollable ruminations, perseverating
negative affect, and decreases in subjective well-being, responses that
are much less prevalent among action-oriented individuals (Kuhl &
Beckmann, 1994). Effects of action orientation have been found across a
wide range of different measures and domains, including intention
memory, physiological arousal, medicine intake, therapeutic out-
comes, athletic performance, and work psychology. Action orientation
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thus appears to be a global, content-free construct. Moreover, research
has established that the effects of action orientation are not due to
self-efficacy or control expectations (Kuhl, 1981), achievement motiva-
tion (Heckhausen & Strang, 1988), neuroticism (Baumann & Kuhl,
2002), extraversion (Koole, 2003), self-esteem (Koole & Jostmann,
2003), or conscious emotion regulation strategies (Koole & Jostmann,
2003), and occur over and above the effects of the “Big Five” personal-
ity dimensions (Diefendorff et al., 2000). The effects of action
orientation thus seem uniquely attributable to volitional processes.
In recent years, research has examined the influence of action orienta-
tion on some more direct indicators of autonomous functioning. Beck-
mann (1997) demonstrated that action-oriented individuals are less
prone to conformity than state-oriented individuals, particularly under
stressful circumstances. In a related vein, Kuhl and Kazén (1994) estab-
lished that state-oriented individuals are inclined to mistake activities
that were assigned by the experimenter for self-chosen activities, a cog-
nitive tendency that signifies impaired autonomous functioning. By
contrast, action-oriented individuals displayed no evidence of a similar
tendency towards false self-ascriptions. Baumann and Kuhl (2003)
showed that negative affect amplifies the tendency to make false self-as-
criptions among state-oriented individuals, but not among their ac-
tion-oriented counterparts. Taken together, it appears that a demanding
environment is more damaging to autonomous functioning among
state-oriented individuals than among action-oriented individuals.
Even so, some important questions remain about the precise nature of
the volitional shielding skills that underlie action orientation. In particu-
lar, there is little support to date for PSI theory’s claims that action-ori-
ented individuals rely on implicit mechanisms to shield themselves
against external demands. The notion of implicit volitional mechanisms
is theoretically controversial, because traditional accounts have treated
volition as essentially a conscious, deliberative phenomenon (Libet,
1985; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Even so, a growing number of experi-
ments have demonstrated that volitional processes can be active on
fast-acting, implicit levels of information processing (Gollwitzer, 1999;
Kuhl & Kazén, 1999; Shah et al., 2002). It thus seemed worthwhile to in-
vestigate the implicit nature of the autonomy-shielding effects of action
orientation.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
The present research explored the volitional shielding effects of action
orientation on implicit self-evaluation. Recent research has established
that much self-evaluative activity occurs on unconscious, implicit lev-
els (Devos & Banaji, 2003; DeHart, Pelham, & Murray, 2004; Koole &
104 KOOLE
Pelham, 2003). There are several reasons to believe that such implicit
self-evaluations serve important regulatory functions. First, the self
can be regarded as a super-ordinate processing system that integrates
multiple inputs from a host of lower-level systems within the person
(Kuhl, 2000; Nowak, Vallacher, Tesser, & Borkowski, 2000). As such, it
is plausible that the self plays a key role in central executive processes
(Baumeister, 1998; Kuhl & Koole, in press). Second, implicit self-evalu-
ations can guide people’s actions even when their attentional resources
are consumed by ongoing goal pursuits. Accordingly, implicit
self-evaluations may provide a more efficient self-regulatory tool than
reflective, explicit self-evaluations.
In the present research, I conducted two experiments, which were
based on a similar underlying logic. Both experiments first assessed in-
dividual differences in action orientation and subsequently manipu-
lated external demands. After the demand manipulation, participants
performed an implicit self-evaluation task. The main hypothesis in both
studies was that the impact of external demands on autonomy-related
implicit self-evaluations would be moderated by action orientation.
Among state-oriented participants, external demands were expected to
cause decreases in autonomy-related implicit self-evaluations. By con-
trast, external demands were expected to cause no such decreases or
even increases in autonomy-related implicit self-evaluations among
action-oriented participants.
Finally, I explored some potential functional differences between cop-
ing with negative affect and coping with frustrated positive affect. PSI
theory distinguishes between Threat-related Action Orientation (AOT),
which relates to coping with negative affect, and Demand-related Ac-
tion Orientation (AOD), which relates to coping with frustration of posi-
tive affect1 (Kuhl, 2000). Because positive and negative affect are often
strongly (negatively) correlated, effects of AOT and AOD are naturally
confounded. Even so, unique effects of AOT may be found in situations
that are characterized by moderate to high positive affect and high nega-
tive affect. Conversely, unique effects of AOD may be found in situa-
tions that are characterized by low positive affect and moderate to low
negative affect. To address the conceptual distinction between AOT and
AOD, Studies 1 used a demand manipulation that targeted negative
affect, whereas Study 2 targeted suppression of positive affect.
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1. Kuhl (1994) introduced the labels “failure-related” and “decision-related” action ori-
entation to what the present research refers to as “threat-related” and “demand-related”
action orientation, respectively. This departure from the previous terminology was pre-
ferred because the latter terms are more clearly related to the most recent formulation of
PSI theory (e.g., Kuhl, 2000).
STUDY 1
In Study 1, I started by assessing individual differences in action orienta-
tion and then primed external demands by having participants visualize
either a demanding or an accepting relationship partner. Visualizing a
demanding partner was expected to trigger high (implicit or explicit)
feelings of threat to the self, whereas visualizing an accepting partner
was expected to trigger low feelings of self-threat (Schimel et al., 2004).
Following the visualization, participants completed an implicit
self-evaluation task.
The implicit self-evaluation task was constructed on the basis of
evaluative priming research (Fazio, 2001), which has established that
the presentation of an evaluatively charged stimulus (e.g., the word
happiness) facilitates evaluations of similarly valenced targets (e.g., good)
and inhibits evaluations of dissimilarly valenced targets (e.g., bad). This
phenomenon may be used to tap into implicit self-evaluations (Hetts,
Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999). Thus, in the present research, participants
were asked to evaluate a series of positive and negative target words,
which were either preceded by self-related primes (I) or by non-self-re-
lated primes (xx). During the crucial trials of this task, the target words
were either positive or negative words that were related to autonomy.
Based on previous research (Hetts et al., 1999), I assumed that an autono-
mous self was indicated by facilitation of positive autonomy words
and/or inhibition of negative autonomy words by the self-related
primes relative to the non-self-related primes2. The implicit self-evalua-
tion task also included positive and negative target words that related to
competence and relatedness, two other basic human motives (Deci &
Ryan, 2000; McCllelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989). Because the
demand manipulation in Study 1 targeted loss of autonomy, I expected
that the shielding effects of action orientation would be specific to the
autonomy domain.
The key prediction of Study 1 was that action orientation would
moderate the effects of a threatening visualization on autonomy-re-
lated implicit self-evaluations. Among state-oriented participants, the
threatening visualization was expected to yield lower autonomy-re-
lated implicit self-evaluations relative to the non-threatening visual-
ization. By contrast, among action-oriented participants, the
threatening visualization was expected to lead to equal or even en-
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2. It should be emphasized that the present research uses the terms “facilitation” and
“inhibition” in a relative sense. The status of inhibitory mechanisms in particular has been
subject to much debate in cognitive psychology (Anderson & Spellman, 1995). Accord-
ingly, whether volitional shielding involve facilitatory versus inhibitory processes in an
absolute sense is a separate issue that needs to be addressed in future research.
hanced autonomy-related implicit self-evaluations relative to the ac-
cepting visualization. Previous studies have revealed that the
demanding visualization is associated with negative experiences that
involve loss of autonomy (Schimel et al., 2004). Accordingly, it was
expectable that the predicted effects of the visualization manipulation
would be more pronounced for negative autonomy words than for
positive autonomy words. Finally, given the negative focus of the
threatening visualization, the predicted effects were expected to occur
primarily for threat-related action orientation (AOT).
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
At the Free University Amsterdam, 110 paid volunteers (43 men and 67
women, average age 21) participated in the experiment. The experi-
mental design consisted of a 2 (AOT: action vs. state; between partici-
pants) × 2 (visualization: threatening vs. non-threatening; between
participants) × 2 (prime type: “I” vs. “xx”; within participants) × 2 (tar-
get word valence: positive vs. negative; within participants) × 3 (target
word domain: autonomy, relatedness, or competence) design. The
main dependent variable consisted of participants’ evaluation laten-
cies during the implicit self-evaluation task.
PROCEDURE
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were led to individual cubi-
cles, each containing an Apple Macintosh (iMac) computer. The experi-
menter explained that the instructions of the present research would be
administered via a computer-program and left. Participants started the
program by pressing a button on the keyboard. Participants were first in-
formed that the investigation would comprise a number of unrelated
studies, which were supposedly administered together for efficiency rea-
sons. Participants then moved on to the first study, which consisted of two
questionnaires that assessed individual differences in self-esteem and ac-
tion orientation. Participants then proceeded with the next study, which
contained the visualization manipulation. Next, after a brief filler task,
participants completed the implicit self-evaluation task, described as a
study on “the evaluation of stimuli.” Participants then proceeded with
some unrelated studies, after which they answered two manipulation
check questions. Finally, participants were paid, debriefed, and thanked
for their participation.
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Individual Differences. To measure individual differences in action ori-
entation, I used a Dutch translation of the Action Control Scale (ACS90).
The ACS90 has been developed and extensively validated by Kuhl and as-
sociates (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). I administered two subscales of the
ACS90, which were designed to measure demand-related action orienta-
tion (AOD) and threat-related action orientation (AOT), respectively. The
items of both subscales were presented in a different random order for
each participant. Each of the items of the ACS90 describes a difficult situa-
tion and two alternative ways of coping with the situation. One of these al-
ternatives always referred to an action-oriented way of coping with the
situation; the other alternative always referred to a state-oriented way of
coping with the situation. For each item, participants were asked to
choose which of two alternative responses would describe their reaction
to such a situation.
The AOT scale had 12 items that related to coping with threatening sit-
uations. An example item is “When I am told that my work has been
completely unsatisfactory. A. I don’t let it bother me for too long. B. I feel
paralyzed.” The AOD scale had 12 items that related to coping with dif-
ficult situations that involve the frustration of positive affect. An exam-
ple item is “When I know I must finish something soon. A. I find it easy
to get it done. B. I have to push myself to get started.” For both items, A is
the action-oriented alternative, whereas B represents the state-oriented
alternative. In the actual scale, the order of action—and state-oriented al-
ternatives was counterbalanced across the items of each subscale. Ac-
tion-oriented choices were coded as “1,” whereas state-oriented choices
were coded as “0" and summed for the entire subscale. For both AOT (M
= 5.84, SD = 3.14, Cronbach’s alpha = .71) and AOD (M = 6.99, SD = 2.88,
Cronbach’s alpha = .73), participants who made 7 or more action-ori-
ented choices were assigned to the action-oriented group; participants
who made 6 or fewer action-oriented choices were assigned to the
state-oriented group3.
I further administered the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (M=
6.71, SD = 1.00, Cronbach’s alpha = .80). Items of the self-esteem scale
were translated into Dutch and scored on 9-point scales (1= does not ap-
ply to me at all; 9 = applies to me completely). Moreover, the items were
presented in a different random order for each participant.
Visualization Manipulation. The visualization manipulation was mod-
eled after Baldwin and Sinclair, (1996). In the threatening visualization
condition, participants were asked to think of highly demanding per-
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3. Similar results were obtained when AOT and AOD scores were used as continuous
variables in regression analyses that paralleled the ANOVAs reported in the main body of
this article.
son, someone who pressured and criticized them if they failed to meet
the person’s standards. In the non-threatening visualization condition,
participants were asked to think of a person with whom they could be
genuinely themselves and felt very much at ease. In both conditions, the
instructions encouraged participants to vividly imagine being with this
person and to re-experience the feelings associated with the
relationship.
DEPENDENT MEASURE
Implicit Self-Evaluation Task. During the implicit self-evaluation task,
participants were requested to evaluate a series of valenced words that
appeared on the center of the computer screen. During each trial, an as-
terisk would appear on the center of the computer screen to focus partic-
ipants’ attention on the appropriate location. After this, a prime word
would appear on the computer screen for 200 ms, followed by a blank
screen that stayed on for 100 ms. Past research has shown that evaluative
priming is most robust at this SOA and priming duration (Fazio, 2001).
Participants were told to ignore the briefly appearing words (i.e., the
primes), as these were merely meant to distract them. Following the
prime word and blank screen, a target word appeared on same location
of the computer screen. Participants were told to press the “a” button
(left of the keyboard) when the target word was negative. Conversely,
participants were told to press the “6" button (right of the keyboard)
when the target word was positive. The target word disappeared from
the screen once participants had pressed either the ”a" or “6" button.
After one second, the next trial began.
The implicit self-evaluation task began with three warm-up trials that
were followed by 36 experimental trials. During one half of the trials,
participants were primed with the word “ik” (“I” in Dutch). During the
other half of the trials, participants were primed with two x-es. The tar-
get words consisted of 6 autonomy words, 6 relatedness words, and 6
competence words (see Appendix). One half of these target words had a
positive meaning. The remaining target words had a negative meaning.
The target words were presented twice in a different random order for
each participant: once preceded by the self prime and once preceded by
the xx-prime.
RESULTS
MANIPULATION CHECK
At the end of the experimental session, participants rated how demand-
ing and accepting the person was whom they had visualized (1 = not at
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all; 9 = very much). These two items were coded in the same direction
and aggregated into a single scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .61). On average,
participants in the threatening visualization condition rated their target
person as much more demanding than participants in the non-threaten-
ing visualization condition, F (1,108) = 225.35, p < .001 (M = 6.71 vs. M =
3.14). No effects of individual differences in action orientation or
self-esteem emerged on this index.
AUTONOMY-RELATED IMPLICIT SELF-EVALUATIONS
Before analyzing the results, erroneous responses were removed from
the data set. In addition, outliers (i.e., responses longer than 3000 ms)
were replaced by responses of 3000 ms. Implicit self-evaluation scores
were computed by subtracting average response latencies to target
words that were primed with “I” from average response latencies to the
corresponding target words that were primed with “xx”. Positive scores
on the implicit self-evaluation index indicate that the relevant target
words were positively associated with the self; negative scores indicate
that the relevant target words were inhibited by the self.
Participant’s average evaluation latencies of autonomy-related target
words were subjected to a 2 (AOT: state vs. action; between participants)
× 2 (visualization: threatening vs. non-threatening; between partici-
pants) × 2 (target word valence: positive versus negative; within partici-
pants) ANOVA. Relevant means are displayed in Table 1. The analysis
revealed a significant two-way interaction between visualization and
target word valence, F (1, 106) = 7.00, p < .01, which was qualified by the
predicted three-way interaction between AOT, visualization, and target
word valence, F (1, 106) = 4.48, p < .04. The results were then analyzed
separately for positive and negative autonomy-related target words.
The analysis of negative autonomy-related target words yielded a main
effect of visualization, F (1, 106) = 3.96, p < .05, and an interaction be-
tween AOT and visualization, F (1, 106) = 4.46, p < .04. Follow-up tests re-
vealed that the threatening visualization caused state-oriented
participants to associate the self more strongly with loss of autonomy (M
=—96 vs. M = 105). By contrast, the threatening visualization had no ef-
fect on action-oriented participants, F < 1 (M =—5 vs. M =—11). The
analysis of positive autonomy-related target words only yielded a mar-
ginal effect of visualization, F (1, 106) = 3.07, p = .083. Follow-up tests
showed that the main effect of visualization was only reliable for
state-oriented participants, F (1, 106) = 3.07, p = .083. The threatening vi-
sualization led state-oriented participants to associate the self less
strongly with autonomy (M = 86 vs. M =—73). By contrast, the threaten-
ing visualization had no effect on action-oriented participants, F < 1 (M =
67 vs. M = 21).
110 KOOLE
Another way to look at the results is to examine each experimental
condition separately. In the non-threatening visualization condition,
the only significant effect that emerged was a main effect of target word
valence, F (1, 48) = 4.07, p < .05, indicating that participants associated
the self more strongly with positive autonomy words than with nega-
tive autonomy words (M = 79 vs. M =—61). However, this effect was re-
liable only among state-oriented participants, F (1, 30) = 5.25, p < .03,
not among action-oriented participants, F (1, 18) < 1. In the threatening
visualization condition, the only significant effect that emerged was a
interaction between AOT and target word valence, F (1, 58) = 5.43, p <
.03. Among state-oriented individuals, the self was associated more
strongly with negative autonomy words than with positive autonomy
words, F (1, 30) = 6.40, p < .02. The latter effect was absent among ac-
tion-oriented individuals, F (1, 28) < 1.
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES
The analysis of relatedness and competence target words in the implicit
self-evaluation task yielded no parallel effects of AOT and visualization.
The results were thus specific to the autonomy motive. AOT was weakly
correlated with AOD, r (110)= .18, p =.063, and moderately with self-es-
teem r (110)= .34, p < .001. Neither AOD nor self-esteem had effects that
paralleled the effects of AOT.
DISCUSSION
As anticipated, Study 1 found that a threatening visualization led
state-oriented participants to display stronger associations between
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TABLE 1. Average Facilitation (ms) of Positive and Negative Autonomy-Related
Words by Self-Priming as a Function of Visualization, Threat-Related Action
Orientation, and Response Valence (Study 1; Standard Deviations in parentheses)
Target Valence
Positive Negative
SOT AOT SOT AOT
Non-Threatening Visualization 86 (327) 67 (316) -96 (263) -5 (246)
Threatening Visualization -73 (300) 21 (260) 105 (243) -11 (250)
Note. SOT = Threat-Related State Orientation, AOT = Threat-Related Action Orientation.
the self and negative autonomy-related evaluations. It thus appears
that, among state-oriented participants, a threatening visualization
activated implicit evaluations of the self as weak and dependent. By
contrast, the threatening visualization had no effect on negative au-
tonomy-related implicit self-evaluations among action-oriented par-
ticipants. A similar, albeit somewhat weaker, shielding pattern
emerged for positive autonomy-related evaluations. The threatening
visualization led state-oriented participants to display weaker associ-
ations between the self and positive autonomy-related evaluations.
By contrast, the threatening visualization had no effect on action-ori-
ented participants. Taken together, it appears that action-oriented
participants were more successful than state-oriented participants at
shielding themselves against the autonomy-undermining influence
of the threatening visualization.
It is notable that state-oriented participants displayed evidence of au-
tonomous implicit self-evaluations in the non-threatening visualization
condition. Indeed, in the non-threatening condition, state-oriented par-
ticipants displayed more autonomy-related implicit self-evaluations
than action-oriented participants. This pattern is consistent with previ-
ous observations that state-oriented individuals can function quite well
under relaxing conditions, during which they may even outperform
action-oriented individuals (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994).
STUDY 2
In Study 2, I sought to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a different
demand manipulation. More specifically, Study 2 manipulated external
demands by varying whether rewards were contingent on performance
or not. This manipulation had a number of advantages. First, perfor-
mance-contingent rewards are a frequent form of demand in real-life sit-
uations. Second, the manipulation did not rely on self-generated
memories, thereby allowing for more experimental control. Third, the
manipulation of reward contingency represented an online stressor, as
opposed to the memory-based stressor that was used in Study 1. Finally,
reward contingency represented a prospective manipulation of external
demand. Past work suggests that prospective tasks are particularly rele-
vant to demand-related action orientation (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993).
Moreover, according to PSI theory, coping with a prospective memory
load involves the frustration of positive affect (Kuhl & Kazén, 1999). The
reward contingencies manipulation thus enabled a stronger test of the
volitional shielding effects of action orientation in the domain of positive
autonomy-related implicit self-evaluations. Consequently, the effects of
Study 2 were expected to occur mainly for AOD, that is, demand-related
action orientation.
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To increase the generalizability of the results of Study 1, Study 2 in-
cluded a broader set of target stimuli in the implicit self-evaluation
task. Finally, Study 2 included a measure of individual differences in
deliberative emotion regulation (Gross & John, 2002), to examine
whether the results were indeed attributable to implicit volitional
mechanisms.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
At the Free University Amsterdam, 84 paid volunteers (18 men and 66
women, average age 21) participated in the experiment. The experimen-
tal design consisted of a 2 (AOD: action vs. state; between participants) ×
2 (rewards: non-contingent vs. performance-contingent; between partic-
ipants) × 2 (prime type: “I” vs. “xx”; within participants) × 2 (target va-
lence: positive vs. negative; within participants) × 3 (target domain:
autonomy, relatedness, or competence) design. The main dependent
variable consisted of participants’ average evaluation latencies during
the implicit self-evaluation task.
PROCEDURE
The general procedure and equipment were quite similar to those of
Study 1. Participants first answered a few personality questionnaires.
They then moved on to the next study, which consisted of a number of
arithmetic items. The arithmetic sums were followed by the manipula-
tion of reward contingency. After a brief filler task, participants com-
pleted the implicit self-evaluation task. Participants next proceeded
with some unrelated studies. Finally, participants answered a manipu-
lation check question, were probed on their beliefs, paid, and de-
briefed. Four participants (4.7% of the sample) were excluded from the
analysis because they indicated that they were familiar with the im-
plicit self-evaluation task. One additional participant (1.1% of the sam-
ple) was excluded because she had an unusually high error rate (> 50%)
on the implicit self-evaluation task.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Individual Differences. The assessment included measures of AOT (M =
5.55, SD = 2.97, alpha = .75), AOD (M = 6.58, SD = 2.91, alpha = .74), and
self-esteem (M = 6.56, SD = 1.19, alpha = .86) and a Dutch translation of the
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). One
subscale of the ERQ measured chronic reliance on cognitive reappraisal
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strategies to regulate one’s emotions (6 items; M = 5.86, SD = 1.22, alpha =
.74), the second subscale of the ERQ measured chronic reliance on emo-
tional suppression strategies (4 items; M = 3.94, SD = 1.68, alpha = .79).
Reward Contingency Manipulation. During the arithmetic task, partici-
pants were asked to solve a number of arithmetic items. For each item,
participants were to add up three one-or two-digit numbers and type
in the correct response. Participants first practiced solving one arith-
metic item to ensure that they understood the task. After these instruc-
tions, participants were given 2.5 minutes to complete as many
arithmetic items as possible. The remaining time was visually dis-
played on the computer screen by means of a small alarm clock. After
completing the arithmetic sums, participants received feedback re-
garding the number of arithmetic items that they had solved correctly.
Following this feedback, the manipulation of reward contingency was
introduced.
Participants in the contingent reward condition were informed that
there would be a second block of arithmetic sums. The instructions
explained that the level of difficulty and the amount of time for the
second block of sums would be identical to the first block. However,
this time, participants would be able to earn a bonus. If participants
succeeded in solving at least 10% more sums than during the first
block, they would earn a bonus of 1 Euro. If participants succeeded in
solving at least 25% more sums than during the first block, they
would earn a bonus of 2.50 Euro. Participants were further told that
the second block of arithmetic sums would be preceded by a few unre-
lated studies, allegedly to avoid fatigue. In reality, these ‘unrelated
studies’ contained our measure of implicit self-evaluation. Partici-
pants in the non-contingent reward condition were informed that they
had solved more arithmetic items than the average participant within
the same amount of time. Accordingly, they were given an extra bo-
nus of 2.50 Euro. The positive feedback and unexpected bonus were
supplied to induce a positive, rewarding context and to allow the
overall financial compensation for the arithmetic task to be equal
across experimental conditions. No mention was made of a second
block of arithmetic sums, to ensure that participants in the non-con-
tingent reward condition were not provided with a prospective
memory load (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993).
DEPENDENT MEASURE
Implicit Self-Evaluation Task. The general procedure and instructions
of the implicit self-evaluation task were identical to Study 1. The only
difference was that Study 2 added 18 new target words to the stimulus
set (see Appendix).
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RESULTS
MANIPULATION CHECK
At the end of the experimental session, all participants indicated cor-
rectly why they would receive an extra bonus of 2.50 Euro.
AUTONOMY-RELATED IMPLICIT SELF-EVALUATIONS
Wrong responses and outliers were treated as in Study 1. Also similar to
Study 1, I computed implicit self-evaluation scores by subtracting par-
ticipants’ response latencies to target words that were primed with “xx”
from participants’ response latencies to the corresponding target words
that were primed with “I”.
A 2 (AOD: state vs. action; between participants) × 2 (reward contin-
gency: non-contingent vs. performance-contingent; between partici-
pants) × 2 (target valence: positive versus negative; within participants)
on participants’ average evaluation latencies yielded a main effect of tar-
get valence, F (1, 75) = 37.28, p < .001, which indicated that, on average,
evaluating positive target words was facilitated by self priming (M =
109), whereas evaluating negative target words was inhibited by self
priming (M =—36). In addition, the analysis revealed a marginal interac-
tion between AOD and reward contingency, F (1, 75) = 3.33, p = .072, and
the predicted three-way interaction between AOD, reward contingency,
and target valence, F (1, 75) = 5.37, p < .03. Relevant means are displayed
in Table 2. Separate analyses revealed no effects of AOD or reward con-
tingency on average evaluation latencies of negative target words, all Fs
< 1. By contrast, average evaluation latencies of positive target words
showed a significant interaction between AOD and reward contingency,
F (1, 75) = 6.55, p < .02. Follow-up tests were conducted to interpret this
interaction effect. Performance-contingent rewards led state-oriented
participants to associate the self non-significantly less strongly with pos-
itive autonomy words, F (1, 75) < 1 (M = 148 vs. M = 101). By contrast,
performance-contingent rewards led action-oriented participants to as-
sociate the self significantly more strongly with positive autonomy
words, F (1, 75) = 8.03 (M = 21 vs. M = 204).
Another way to look at the results is to examine each experimental
condition separately. In the non-contingent reward condition, the only
significant effect that emerged was a main effect of target word valence,
F (1, 39) = 9.95, p < .05, indicating that participants associated the self
more strongly with positive autonomy words than with negative auton-
omy words (M = 79 vs. M =—37). Further tests, however, revealed that
this effect was reliable among state-oriented participants, F (1, 18) = 8.73,
p < .009, but not among action-oriented participants, F (1, 18) = 1.57, p =
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.223. In the contingent reward condition, there emerged a main effect of
target word valence, F (1, 36) = 34.30, p < .001, and a marginal interaction
between AOD and target word valence, F (1, 36) = 3.00, p = .092. Among
state-oriented individuals, the self was associated more strongly with
positive autonomy words than with negative autonomy words, F (1, 22)
= 13.86, p < .002. This effect was somewhat stronger among action-ori-
ented individuals, F (1, 14) = 17.62, p < .002.
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES
The analysis of relatedness and competence target words in the implicit
self-evaluation task yielded no effects that paralleled the results for au-
tonomy target words. Thus, the results of Study 2 were again specific to
the autonomy domain. AOD was positively correlated with AOT, r (79)
= .29, p < .02) and self-esteem, r (79) = .31, p < .006, and negatively corre-
lated with suppression, r (79) =—.28 p < .02. Reappraisal was
uncorrelated with AOD, r (79) = .02, p = .851. None of these alternative
constructs had similar effects as AOD.
DISCUSSION
In Study 2, performance-contingent rewards led action-oriented partici-
pants to display stronger associations between the self and positive au-
tonomy-related evaluations. Coping with performance-contingent
rewards apparently caused action-oriented individuals to activate im-
plicit evaluations of the self as strong and independent. By contrast,
state-oriented individuals showed no evidence of an implicit autonomy
boost in response to performance-contingent rewards. Notably, no effects
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TABLE 2. Average Facilitation (ms) of Positive and Negative Autonomy-Related
Words by Self-Priming as a Function of Reward Contingency, Demand-Related Action
Orientation, and Response Valence (Study 2; Standard Deviations in parentheses)
Target Valence
Positive Negative
Reward SOD AOD SOD AOD
Non-Contingent 148 (202) 21 (227) -25 (180) -39 (109)
Performance-Contingent 100 (171) 204 (179) -31 (158) -39 (147)
Note. SOD = Demand-Related State Orientation, AOD = Demand-Related Action Orientation.
of reward contingency or action orientation were obtained in the domain
of negative autonomy-related implicit self-evaluations. This pattern of
findings suggests that coping with reward contingency was primarily a
matter of mobilizing positive autonomous self-evaluations, as opposed to
warding off self-evaluations concerning loss of autonomy (as in Study 1).
Similar to Study 1, Study 2 found that state-oriented individuals dis-
played facilitation of positive autonomy-related implicit self-evalua-
tions under low demand condition (i.e., the non-contingent reward
condition). This finding confirms the notion that volitional shielding
only contributes to autonomous functioning when the person’s auton-
omy is under attack. It is further striking that Study 1 found stronger au-
tonomy-shielding effects of action orientation for negative
autonomy-related implicit self-evaluations, whereas Study 2 only ob-
tained reliable shielding effects for positive autonomy-related implicit
self-evaluations. Because Study 2 also used a larger stimulus set, one
might wonder whether the discrepancy between the results of Studies 1
and 2 could be explained by this procedural variation. To examine this
possibility, the results of Study 2 were re-analyzed using only the target
words that were used on Study 1. This analysis yielded virtually the
same pattern of results as the analysis that used the entire set of target
words.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research explored the role of action orientation in shielding
the self against the potentially undermining influence of external de-
mands. Based on PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, in press), I rea-
soned that action-oriented individuals possess volitional skills that
enable them to shield the self against external demands. Accordingly,
the autonomy-undermining effects of external demands should be
mainly apparent among individuals low on action orientation, i.e.,
state-oriented individuals. Consistent with this, Study 1 found that a
threatening visualization caused state-oriented individuals to display
less autonomous implicit self-evaluations. By contrast, a threatening vi-
sualization had no effect on autonomous implicit self-evaluations
among action-oriented individuals. In addition, Study 2 showed that
performance-contingent rewards caused action-oriented individuals to
display more autonomous implicit self-evaluations, an effect that was
not obtained among state-oriented participants. Taken together, it ap-
pears that action orientation can provide a powerful psychological
shield against autonomy-undermining influences of the social
environment.
What might be the nature of the volitional shielding skills that under-
lie action orientation? First, it is informative that shielding effects of ac-
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tion orientation occurred only for autonomy-related implicit
self-evaluations, but not for implicit self-evaluations that related to com-
petence or interpersonal relatedness. These findings rule out a straight-
forward self-enhancement account of the present findings (Sedikides &
Strube, 1997). Second, the present research found that different demand
manipulations selectively triggered coping responses of either
threat—or demand-related action orientation. Indeed, the visualization
manipulation in Study 1 mainly activated shielding effects of threat-re-
lated action orientation, whereas performance-contingent rewards in
Study 2 only activated shielding effects of demand-related action orien-
tation. In addition, threat—versus demand-related action orientation
were associated with somewhat different shielding responses.
Threat-related action orientation helped shield against the association
between self and negative affect (i.e., loss of autonomy) in response to
the visualization of a threatening person. By contrast, demand-related
action orientation enhanced the association between self and positive af-
fect (i.e., autonomy) in response to performance-contingent rewards.
Taken together, these findings support the existence of two functionally
independent forms of volitional shielding that map on to the conceptual
distinction between threat—or demand-related action orientation
(Kuhl, 2000).
Notably, the shielding effects of action orientation were obtained in a
research paradigm that incorporated several implicit aspects. First, the
present research primed external demands in a context that was, from
the participants’ point of view, unrelated to the measurement of auton-
omous functioning. Moreover, findings in Study 2 indicated that voli-
tional shielding effects were not predicted by conscious affect
regulation skills (Gross & John, 2002). It thus appears that volitional
shielding is not mediated by conscious intentions. Second, the mea-
surement of autonomous functioning was based on an implicit
self-evaluation task (Hetts et al., 1999). This paradigm is known to as-
sess highly efficient, “automatic” self-evaluations. As such, the voli-
tional shielding effects of action orientation seem to be characterized
by highly efficient cognitive processing. Taken together, the present
findings add to the growing support for volitional processes that oper-
ate on fast-acting, quasi-automatic levels (Fishbach, Friedman, &
Kruglanski, 2003; Gollwitzer, 1999; Kuhl & Kazén, 1999; Koole, Smeets,
van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer,
Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Shah et al., 2003; Wilson & Schooler, 1991; see
Kuhl & Koole, in press).
The present findings may also inform the ongoing debate whether
external demands are detrimental (Deci & Ryan, 2000) or beneficial
(Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996) to autonomous functioning. Based on
the present research, the two sides of this debate may be integrated.
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Undermining effects of external demands may occur primarily
among state-oriented individuals, because these individuals are un-
able to shield themselves against external interference (Baumann &
Kuhl, 2003; Beckmann, 1997; Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). By contrast, ac-
tion-oriented individuals appear to shield themselves effectively
against external interference. Consequently, the autonomy-enhanc-
ing effects of external demands may occur primarily among ac-
tion-oriented individuals. Importantly, this integrative perspective
agrees with the self-determination perspective that autonomy is a
core aspect of effective volitional functioning. The perspective adds,
however, that the conditions under which autonomy can be main-
tained are dependent on people’s coping resources. As long the per-
son has adequate coping resources (i.e., when she or he is
action-oriented), external demands may be transformed into a posi-
tive challenge and hence may even contribute to autonomous func-
tioning. It is only when the person’s coping resources are insufficient
(i.e., when she or he is state-oriented) that external demands become
detrimental to autonomous functioning.
Are state-oriented individuals always condemned to function less au-
tonomously than action-oriented individuals? Not necessarily. Voli-
tional shielding pertains to the ability to ward off undermining
influences on the self’s autonomy. In the absence of undermining influ-
ences, then, state-oriented individuals might be capable of autonomous
functioning at least as much as action-oriented individuals. Consistent
with this, the present research found that state-oriented individuals
maintained high levels of autonomous implicit self-evaluations in the
absence of external demands. The critical difference between ac-
tion—and state-oriented individuals is thus whether autonomous func-
tioning is internally versus externally regulated. Action-oriented
individuals are inclined towards internal regulation of the autonomous
self, so that their self can be most autonomous when external demands
are high. State-oriented individuals, by contrast, are prone to external
regulation of the autonomous self. When circumstances are hostile,
state-oriented individuals’ access to their autonomous self becomes
blocked; however, when circumstances are benign, state-oriented indi-
viduals become capable of accessing their autonomous self. This charac-
terization is consistent with Kuhl and Beckmann’s (1994) observation
that state-oriented individuals can outperform action-oriented individ-
uals under relaxing conditions. Presumably, state-oriented individuals’
reliance on external support may allow them to benefit more from relax-
ing conditions than action-oriented individuals, who are oriented
towards internal regulation. Overall, both action—and state-orientated
individuals seem capable of autonomous functioning, albeit under very
different circumstances.
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The present research has several limitations and thus leaves many
important issues to be explored by future research. First, the present
research only used implicit self-evaluations to assess autonomous
functioning. Obviously, there exist many other valid indicators of the
autonomy motive, including self-report measures (Deci & Ryan,
2000), free-choice behavior (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kuhl & Kazén, 1994),
self-infiltrations (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kuhl & Kazén, 1994), la-
tency of self-compatibility checking (Kazén, Baumann, & Kuhl, 2003),
and conformity (Beckmann, 1997). Notably, research using some of
these alternative indicators has supported the autonomy-shielding
role of action orientation (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Beckmann, 1997;
Kazén et al., 2003). Still, it seems important to extend the present find-
ings to a broader range of autonomy-related phenomena. Another
task for future research lies in further exploring the implicit processes
that underlie autonomous functioning. In recent years, substantial
progress has been made in measuring implicit aspects of the self
(Devos & Banaji, 2003; Kazén et al., 2003; Koole & Pelham, 2003). In-
corporating more of these implicit methodologies should signifi-
cantly advance our understanding of the autonomous self. Finally,
future work may explore the effects of action orientation across a
broader range of threats, such as social comparisons (Stapel &
Swinghammer, 2004; Vohs & Heatherton, 2004), negative self-rele-
vant information (Sedikides & Green, 2004; Wentura & Greve, 2004),
and stereotype threat (Schimel et al., 2004; Steele & Aronson, 1995).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The self is a dynamic psychological structure that is in constant interac-
tion with the outside world. An overload of outside influences, how-
ever, can interfere with the self’s healthy functioning (Nowak et al.,
2000). The self therefore needs to rely on defense mechanisms to pre-
serve its overall integrity (Sedikides & Green, 2004; Stapel &
Swinghammer, 2004; Wentura & Greve, 2004). The present research illu-
minates how volitional resources such as action orientation may assist in
the crucial task of shielding the self against the psychological burdens of
external demands. This volitional shielding function of action orienta-
tion may even be effective on implicit, unconscious levels, so that action
orientation appears to be a highly efficient self-regulatory resource. Vo-
litional shielding may thus allow people to live in freedom, even under
the weight of pressing external demands.
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APPENDIX: TARGET WORDS OF THE IMPLICIT
SELF-EVALUATION TASK
Autonomy Words Loss of Autonomy Words
*Sterk (strong) *Zwak (weak)
*Zelfverzekerd (self-confident) *Onderdanig (submissive)
*Zelfstandig (autonomous) *Machteloos (powerless)
Krachtig (powerful) Onzeker (insecure)
Moedig (brave) Bang (fearful)
Onafhankelijk (independent) Vernederd (humiliated)
Relatedness Words Loss of Relatedness Words
*Lief (lovely) *Afgewezen (rejected)
*Gezellig (cozy) *Verstoten (abandoned)
*Aardig (kind) *Eenzaam (lonely)
Populair (popular) Afgedankt (discarded)
Geliefd (loved) Alleen (alone)
Aantrekkelijk (attractive) Lelijk (ugly)
Competence Words Loss of Competence Words
*Winnaar (winner) *Verliezer (looser)
*Succesvol (successful) *Mislukt (failed)
*Doorzetten (to persist) *Opgeven (to quit)
Geslaagd (passed) Gezakt (flunked)
Scoren (to score) Verslagen (defeated
Beloning (reward) Falen (to fail)
Note. Words marked with an asterisk were used in both Studies 1 and 2; unmarked
words were only used in Study 2.
REFERENCES
Amabile, T. M. (1979). Effects of external evaluation on artistic creativity. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 211-233.
Anderson, M. C., & Spellman, B. A. (1995). On the status of inhibitory mechanisms in
cognition: Memory retrieval as a model case. Psychological Review, 102, 68-100.
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one
against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs, 70:(9).
Baldwin, M. W., & Sinclair, L. (1996). Self-esteem and “if ... then” contingencies of in-
terpersonal acceptance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71,
1130-1141.
Baumeister, R. F. (1984). Choking under pressure: Self-consciousness and paradoxi-
cal effects of incentives on skillful performance. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 46, 610-620.
Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Hand-
book of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 680-740). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Baumann, N., & Kuhl, J. (2002). Intuition, affect, and personality: Unconscious coher-
ence judgments and self-regulation of negative affect. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 83, 1213-1223.
Baumann, N., & Kuhl, J. (2003). Self-infiltration: Confusing assigned tasks as self-se-
lected in memory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 487-498.
Beckmann, J. (1997). Alienation and conformity. Unpublished manuscript, Max Planck
Institute for Psychological Research, Munich, Germany.
Carton, J. S. (1996). The differential effects of tangible rewards and praise on intrinsic
motivation: A comparison of cognitive evaluation theory and operant theory.
Behavior Analyst, 19, 237-255.
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments
examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological
Bulletin, 125, 627-668.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human
needs and the self-determination perspective. Psychological Inquiry, 11,
227-268.
DeHart, T., Pelham, B. W., & Murray, S. (2004). Implicit dependency regulation:
Self-esteem, relationship closeness, and implicit evaluations of close others.
Social Cognition, 22, 126-146.
Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Implicit self and identity. In M. R. Leary & J. P.
Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 153-175). New York: Guilford.
Diefendorff, J. M., Hall, R.J., Lord, R. G., & Strean, M. L. (2000). Action-state orienta-
tion: Construct validity of a revised measure and its relationship to work-re-
lated variables. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 250-263.
Eisenberger, R., & Cameron, J. (1996). Detrimental effects of reward: Reality or myth?
American Psychologist, 53, 676-679.
Eisenberger, R. & Rhoades, L. (2001). Incremental effects of reward on creativity. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 728-741.
Fazio, R. H. (2001 On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An over-
view. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 115-141.
Fishbach, A., Friedman, R. S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). Leading us not into tempta-
122 KOOLE
tion: Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 84, 296-309.
Geen, R. G. (1995). Human motivation: A social psychological approach. Pacific Grove,
CA: Brooks/Cole.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple plans.
American Psychologist, 54, 493-503.
Goschke, T., & Kuhl, J. (1993). Representation of intentions: Persisting activation in
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
19, 1211-1226.
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation pro-
cesses: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 85, 348-362.
Heckhausen, H. (1991). Motivation and action. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Heckhausen, H., & Strang, H. (1988). Efficiency under record performance demands:
Exertion control-an individual difference variable? Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 55, 489-498.
Hetts, J. J., Sakuma, M, & Pelham, B. W. (1999). Two roads to positive regard: Implicit
and explicit self-evaluation and culture. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 35, 512-559.
Kasser, T., & Sheldon, K. (in press). Non-becoming, alienated becoming, and authen-
tic becoming: A goal-based approach. To appear in J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, &
T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental existential psychology. New
York: Guilford.
Kazén, M. Baumann, N. & Kuhl, J. (2003). Self-infiltration versus self-compatibility
checking in dealing with unattractive tasks: The moderating role of state ver-
sus action orientation. Motivation and Emotion, 27, 157-197.
Koole, S. L. (2003). Volitional regulation of automatic affect: The moderating role of action
orientation. Unpublished data. Free University Amsterdam.
Koole, S. L., & Jostmann, N. (2003). Getting a grip on your feelings: Effects of action orien-
tation and social demand on intuitive affect regulation. Unpublished manuscript,
Free University Amsterdam.
Koole, S. L., & Pelham, B. W. (2003). On the nature of implicit self-esteem: The case of
the name letter effect. In S. Spencer and M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Motivated social per-
ception: The Ontario Symposium, (Vol. 9, pp. 93-166). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Koole, S. L., & Kuhl, J. (2003). In search of the real self: A functional perspective on op-
timal self-esteem and authenticity. Psychological Inquiry.
Koole, S.L., Smeets, K., Van Knippenberg, A., & Dijksterhuis, A. (1999). The cessation
of rumination through self-affirmation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 77, 111-125.
Kuhl, J. (1981). Motivational and functional helplessness: The moderating effect of
state versus action orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40,
155-170.
Kuhl, J. (1994b). Action versus state orientation: Psychometric properties of the Ac-
tion Control Scale (ACS-90). In J. Kuhl & J. Beckmann (Eds.), Volition and per-
sonality: State versus action orientation, (pp. 47-59). Göttingen: Hogrefe & Huber.
Kuhl, J. (2000). A functional-design approach to motivation and self-regulation: The
dynamics of personality systems interactions. In Boekaerts, M., Pintrich, P. R.,
VOLITIONAL SHIELDING OF THE SELF 123
& Zeidner, M. (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation (pp. 111-169). San Diego:
Academic Press.
Kuhl, J., & Beckmann, J. (1994). Volition and personality: State versus action orientation.
Göttingen: Hogrefe & Huber.
Kuhl, J., & Kazén, M. (1994). Self-discrimination and memory: State orientation and
false self-ascription of assigned activities. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 66, 1103-1115.
Kuhl, J., & Kazén, M. (1999). Volitional facilitation of difficult intentions: Joint activa-
tion of intention memory and positive affect removes Stroop interference. Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 382-399.
Kuhl, J., & Koole, S. L. (in press). Workings of the will: A functional approach. To ap-
pear in J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experi-
mental existential psychology. New York: Guilford.
McClelland, D. C., Koestner, R., & Weinberger, J. (1989). How do self-attributed and
implicit motives differ? Psychological Review, 96, 690-702.
McClelland,J. L., McNaughton, B. L., & O’Reilly, R. C. (1995). Why there are comple-
mentary learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex: Insights from
the successes and failures of connectionist models of learning and memory.
Psychological Review, 102, 419-457.
McGraw, K. O., & McCullers, J. C. (1979). Evidence of a detrimental effect of extrinsic
incentives on breaking a mental set. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15,
285-294.
Moskowitz, G. B., Gollwitzer, P. M., Wasel, W., & Schaal, B. (1999). Preconscious con-
trol of stereotype activation through chronic egalitarian goals. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 77, 167-184.
Nowak, A., Vallacher, R. R., Tesser, A., & Borkowski, W. (2000). Society of self: The
emergence of collective properties in self-structure. Psychological Review, 107,
39-61.
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2003). Freedom versus fear: On
the defense, growth, and expansion of the self. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney
(Eds), Handbook of Self and Identity (pp. 314-343). London: Guilford.
Read, S. J., Vanman, E. J., & Miller, L. C. (1997). Connectionism, parallel constraint
satisfaction processes, and Gestalt principles: (Re)introducing cognitive dy-
namics to social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 26-53.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Schimel, J., Arndt, J., Banko, K. M., & Cook, A. (2004). Not all self-affirmations were
created equal: The cognitive and social benefits of affirming the intrinsic (ver-
sus extrinsic) self. Social Cognition, 22, 75-99.
Schimel, J., Arndt, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2001). Being accepted for who
we are: Evidence that social validation of the intrinsic self reduces general de-
fensiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 35-52.
Sedikides, C., & Green, J. D. (2004). What I don’t recall can’t hurt me: Information
negativity versus information inconsistency as determinants of memorial
self-defense. Social Cognition, 22, 4-29.
Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. (1997). Self-evaluation: To thine own self be good, t o
thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, to thine own self be better. In
124 KOOLE
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology ( Vol. 29, pp.
209-269). New York: Academic Press.
Shah, J. Y., Kruglanski, A. W., & Friedman, R. (2003). Goal systems theory: Integrat-
ing the cognitive and motivational aspects of self-regulation. In S. Spencer, S.
Fein, & M P. Zanna (Eds.), Motivated social perception: The Ontario Symposium
(Vol. 9, pp. 247-276). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
J. Olson & M. Zanna (Eds.), The Ontario symposium on personality and social psychology.
New Jersey: Erlbaum.
Stapel, D. A., & Swinghammer, S. (2004). Defensive social comparisons and the con-
straints of reality. Social Cognition, 22, 147-167.
Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual performance
of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 797-811.
Vohs, K. D., & Heatherton, T. F. (2004). Ego threat elicits different social comparison
processes among high and low self-esteem people: implications for likability
and interpersonal perceptions. Social Cognition, 22, 168-191.
Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources of the ex-
perience of will. American Psychologist, 54, 480-492.
Wentura, D., & Greve, W. (2004). Who wants to be ... erudite? Everyone! Evidence for
automatic adaptation of trait definitions. Social Cognition, 22, 30-53.
Wilson, T. D., & Schooler, J. W. (1991). Thinking too much: Introspection can reduce
the quality of preferences and decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 60, 181-192.
VOLITIONAL SHIELDING OF THE SELF 125

